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“In primitive trafﬁc the economic man is
awaking but very gradually to an under-
standing of the economic advantages to be
gained by exploitation of existing opportuni-
ties of exchange...Consider how seldom it is
the case, that a commodity owned by some-
body is of less value in use than another
commodity owned by someone else!  And for
the latter just the opposite relation is the case.
But how much more seldom does it happen
that these two bodies meet!...Even in the rel-
atively simple and so often recurring case,
where an economic unit, A, requires a com-
modity possessed by B, and B requires one
possessed by C, while C wants one that is
owned by A—even here, under a rule of mere
barter, the exchange of the goods in question
would as a rule be of necessity left undone.”
— Carl Menger, “On the Origin of Money,”
The Economic Journal (June 1892), p. 242.
“Money, I consider, is a device which facil-
itates the working of markets.” Sir John Hicks,
A Market Theory of Money (1989), p. 2.
A
major problem in monetary economics has
been to introduce money into the economy in
a way that: (1) explains how money arises endoge-
nously, (2) explains why money is preferred to other
methods of exchange, and (3) identiﬁes the welfare
gains associated with money’s use.  Money has been
introduced by including it as an argument in con-
sumers’ utility functions or producers’ production
functions, assuming the existence of a welfare-reduc-
ing cash-in-advance constraint, assuming that it is
a vehicle for making intergeneration transfers with
no role in exchange, or simply assuming that money
exists—although it is given no speciﬁc role to play.1
This paper develops a framework for assessing
money’s role and the welfare gains associated with
its use.  This framework shows how money reduces
the resources necessary for exchange, thereby in-
creasing both consumption and leisure.  The welfare
gains from trade are enhanced because the use of
money promotes further trade and greater special-
ization.  For expository purposes the analysis is
linear; however, it is more correct to think of trade,
money, and specialization as essentially evolving
simultaneously, with the development of each rein-
forcing the development of the others.  Nevertheless,
I argue if there were no trade, there would be no need
for money.  To understand the role of money in an
exchange economy it is not necessary to know the
precipitous event that set off this evolutionary chain.
By showing how the use of money economizes
on scarce resources, expands trade and promotes
specialization, the analysis makes explicit Laidler’s
claim (1990, p. 47) that “...there is something of the
nature of a public good about money” so that “...we
should be very wary of treating the sum of its pri-
vate products as its social product.”  In so doing,
I show that to determine the welfare gains from
money it is necessary to compare a monetary econ-
omy with economies that use alternative methods of
exchange. The analysis has micro foundations, but
contrary to the trend in macroeconomics, no formal,
explicit general-equilibrium model of money is
developed.  Indeed, the analysis suggests that the
obstacles to the formulation of such a model of
money are considerable.
The analysis is presented in four sections.  The
ﬁrst section develops a model of an autarkic econ-
omy and derives a measure of social welfare as a
function of economic resources.  In the second
section, individuals are permitted to trade and sev-
eral fundamental consequences of costly trade are
derived and discussed.  The third section argues
that there only are three possible methods of effect-
ing exchange: barter (simple and sequential), credit
(simple and sequential), and money.  Because eco-
nomic agents have an incentive to choose the least
costly method of effecting exchange, an analysis of
the relative cost of each of these methods reveals
why the world has been dominated by monetary,
rather than barter or credit economies.  The anal-
yses in the ﬁrst three sections provide the spring-
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000 35
Daniel L. Thornton is a vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The author thanks John Duffy, Kevin 
Hoover, David Laidler, Alvin Marty, and Bennett McCallum for helpful comments.  Jonathon Ahlbrecht and Stephen Majesky provided
research assistance.
1 See Hoover (1995) for a discussion of these and other approaches.REVIEW
36      JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
board for the fourth, a discussion of several inter-
esting and difﬁcult questions in monetary theory.
AN AUTARKIC ECONOMY
Many monetary analyses begin by modeling
an economy with money and discuss money’s
implications.  Since the purpose of this article is
to better understand why money exists and how
its use enhances welfare, it seems natural to start
with an economy where there is no money.  More-
over, since I argue that money’s existence depends
on trade, the natural starting place would seem to
be a model of an autarkic economy.  Consider an
economy with N individuals and Q commodities.
Each individual is endowed with a quantity of a
non-depletable resource diR*, where di is the ith
individual’s proportionate share, 0 # di # 1, of
the total economy-wide resource, R, which is ﬁxed
and given at R*.  Individuals are self-sufﬁcient and
maximize utility, where the ith individual’s utility
function is 
(1)                     
Cj
i, j=1, 2,..., Q, denotes the quantities of the Q
commodities consumed by the ith individual and
denotes the amount of time devoted to leisure.  Each
individual produces these commodities via the fol-
lowing production functions,
(2)
where [diR*] denotes the physical quantity of the
resource devoted to the production of the jth com-
modity by the ith individual and Lj
i,  denotes the
amount of the ith individual’s time devoted to the
production of the jth commodity.  The ith individual




to maximize utility, each individual must allocate
resources, diR*, among the production of the Q
consumption goods and the total available time, G,
among the productions of consumption goods and
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diRresults in the ﬁrst-order conditions,
and
.
These conditions are familiar.  The ﬁrst set requires
individuals to allocate resources, diR*, between the
production of the goods that they consume by equat-
ing the ratio of the marginal utilities with the mar-
ginal rate of technical substitution for each pair of
commodities consumed.  The second set requires
individuals to allocate time between the production
of the goods that they consume and leisure by
equating the marginal product of each good with
respect to the labor devoted to its production to the
ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal
utility of that good.
Let Uj
i, (C1*, C2*, ..., CQ*,  *) denote the solution
to the optimization problem for the ith individual.
Assume that utility is measured ordinally, i.e., each
individual assigns a real number, n, to a particular
level of utility such that U ¢ . U, if n¢ . n.  Under
the usual assumptions about preferences and pro-
duction, the ith individual’s maximum utility can
be put into a monotonic relationship with that indi-
vidual’s resources, as illustrated in Figure 1.  The
point of interest is where U intersects the vertical
line at  diR*.  This is the point where the ith indi-
vidual maximizes his well-being given the state of
technology, the available resources and time.
The simple aggregation of the ordinal utility
measures over the N individuals yields an index
of maximum utility for society as a whole, I, 
shown in Figure 2.  Since this index is a linear
combination of monotonically increasing func-
tions in R, for a given distribution of resources,
i.e., a given set of d’s, it is a monotonically increas-
ing function in R as well.  Society’s well being 
is maximized given the state of technology, the
available resources and time at the point where I
intersects society’s resource constraint, R*.  This
is the point of maximum social welfare for the
autarkic economy.
AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the
effects of trade and to show how transactions costs
l
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reduce the beneﬁts from trade, thereby limiting the
extent of trade.  The intent is not to develop a com-
plete model of costly trade, explain the degree of
specialization that one observes, or to specify the
precise beneﬁts from trade.  For simplicity, leisure
is omitted as an argument in the utility function
and exchange and production require only time,
not additional resources, R.
Figure 3 illustrates the autarkic optimum and
the gains from trade.  The point A is the autarkic,
no-trade optimum for individual i.  At point A the
slope of the production frontier 2f¢ 2/f¢ 1 is equal to
the slope of the indifference curve, 2U 1/U2.  The
point marked B is the trade optimum, given the
exchange ratio, l.  By producing more of good 1
and less of good 2, relative to autarky, the indi-
vidual is able to reach a level of consumption that
was infeasible without trade, thereby, increasing
utility from u1 to u2.  With trade the individual 
produces y1 units of good 1 and y2 of good 2 and
consumes C1 and C2 units of good 1 and good 2,
respectively.
Now consider the effects of costly trade.  The
analysis is kept simple by assuming that individual
1 wishes to maximize the utility function U(C1,C2)




where y1and y2 are the quantities of the two goods
produced and L1and L2 are the amounts of labor
time devoted to the production of each of the two
goods.  Assume that the production technologies
are linear, so that the marginal rate of technical
substitution, f¢ 2/f¢ 1, is constant.  Further assume
that individual 1 specialized in the production of
good 1, which can be traded for good 2.  Note that
if exchange is costless, trade will be advantageous
for any exchange ratio l . f¢ 2/f¢ 1.
Assume that the transaction cost, i.e., the
amount of time needed to trade, is ﬁxed at W and
does not vary with the volume of trade.  Given this
assumption and the others, the Lagrangian, L, can
be written as
(5)            
.
Differentiating and solving the usual ﬁrst-order
C f C + - - ( ) - ( ) 2 1 ( ) m l G W
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conditions, yields
(6) 
Equation 6 is the familiar condition that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution equals the exchange ratio.
The effect of costly trade on optimal consump-
tion is illustrated in Figure 4.  The autarkic, no-trade
optimum is denoted by A.  The costless trade opti-
mum, for a given exchange ratio, l, is denoted by
B.  The ﬁxed-cost trade optimum for the same ex-
change ratio is denoted by C.  Costly trade reduces
the welfare gains from trade, as the consumption
of both goods is smaller when trade is costly.  Note
that the volume of trade, T2, is smaller when trade
is costly than when trade is costless, T1.  The rea-
son is that trade draws resources, in this speciﬁc
example time, away from production.  Indeed, if
the cost of trade, W, is large enough, no trade will
take place—the autarkic optimum will dominate
the trade optimum.
The most important thing to notice, however, is
that the exchange ratio that is required to achieve
the costless trade outcome is larger when trade is




A,is the optimum consumption of good 1
in the autarkic economy (see the appendix for
details).  When trade is costly (W . 0), the individ-
ual must be compensated for the cost per unit of y1
that must be given up to make the trade.
This effect of costly trade is more apparent
when exchange costs vary with the volume of
trade.  The exact outcome depends on the assump-
tion made about the nature of these trading costs,
however, the basic effect of costly trade will be
invariant to their nature.  Hence, for simplicity,
assume that the exchange cost, Le, the time that is
required to trade, is proportionate to the volume of
trade, i.e., 

















2 Note that given this speciﬁcation, the marginal exchange costs of
using one more unit of time for exchange rather than production, i.e.,
dLe/dL1 = af ¢ , depends on the marginal product of labor.  The greater
the marginal product of labor, the larger is the marginal cost of
exchange. This fact may help explain why some individuals specialize
in production and others specialize in marketing or exchange.  For
example, the stereotypical western storekeeper is someone who can-
















Again, the individual is assumed to specialize in the
production of good 1.  Moreover, the total amount
of time, G, is used either in the production of good
1, L1, or exchange, Le, i.e., G = L1 + Le.  The
LaGrangian for this maximization problem is
(7)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition yields,
(8)
If a = 0, this condition reduces to the previous
one.  When there are no exchange costs, an
individual who specializes in the production of
good 1 is better off trading whenever the exchange
ratio, l, is greater than or equal to the individual’s
ﬁxed marginal rate of technical substitution, i.e., l
. f¢ 2/f¢ 1.  When exchange costs vary with the volume
of trade, however, the marginal condition for trade
becomes l . (11af¢ 1)(f¢ 2/f¢ 1).3
The effect of marginal exchange costs is
illustrated in Figure 5.  The point marked C is the
same as that in Figure 4; namely, it is the optimal
point assuming that the exchange costs are ﬁxed.
D denotes the optimum when exchange costs vary
with the volume of trade.  The effect of variable
trade costs is to reduce the effective exchange rate
for a given exchange ratio, l.  The gains from trade
are smaller than when exchange costs are ﬁxed
and there is a corresponding reduction in the
volume of trade.4 All other things being the same,
the volume of trade falls from T 2 to T 3.  The trade
optimum, for a given l, is pushed closer to the
autarkic no-trade optimum, which again is denoted
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3 The strict inequality is due to the fact that an individual must be
compensated for the total amount of y1 that must be given up to
make the trade.
4 Figure 5 is drawn on the assumption that the total cost of trade in this
example is exactly equal to the ﬁxed costs of trade in the previous
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the autarkic optimum will dominate the trade
optimum for a given l.
Costly trade not only reduces the gains 
from trade, but more importantly, it increases 
the minimum exchange ratio that is required for
the individual to beneﬁt from trade.  Deﬁne the
reservation exchange ratio, rer, to be the minimum
exchange ratio required for an individual to acquire
the same level of utility that would be acquired
under autarky.  If exchange is costless, rer is simply
an individual’s marginal rate of technical substitu-
tion.  Figure 6 shows rer for three assumptions
about exchange costs: There is no cost of
exchange, i.e., a = 0, and two cases where
exchange costs are positive,  a = b . 0 and
a = b¢, b¢ . b.  Figure 6 illustrates that the higher
the exchange cost, the larger is rer, i.e., the more of
good 2 that an individual who specializes in the
production of good 1 must get to compensate for
the cost of trade.  Trade is advantageous only when
the terms of trade are sufﬁciently favorable, i.e., l
is sufﬁciently large to compensate for the cost 
of trade.
All of the above conclusions were predicated
on the assumption that the individual specializes in
the production of good 1.  Hence, it is important to
see how costly trade affects the potential exchange
between individuals where the comparative advan-
tage is well deﬁned.  Assume that individuals 1 and
2 are able to produce both goods 1 and 2.  Again,
the production technologies are assumed to be
linear and the solid gray and black lines, respec-
tively, in Figure 7 denote their production frontiers.
Individual 1 has a comparative advantage in the
production of good 1; individual 2 has a compara-
tive advantage in the production of good 2.  The
exchange ratio at which trade can take place, l,
must be between the slopes of the solid gray and
black lines which, in the case of costless trade, rep-
resent individual 1’s and 2’s rer, respectively.  The
points A and B are optimal if each individual is self-
sufﬁcient.  Point A¢ denotes a trading possibility
where all of the gains from trade accrue to indi-
vidual 2, while B¢ denotes a trade possibility where
all of the beneﬁts from trade accrue to individual 1.
Now assume that both individuals have margin-
al exchange costs, i.e., a1f¢ 1 and a2 f¢ 2, which are posi-
tive but not necessarily equal.  The effect of costly
exchange is to raise the rers for both individuals.
The solid light blue and dark blue lines represent
the rers for individuals 1 and 2, respectively, when
trade is costly.  The dashed dark blue line is parallel
to the solid light blue line and, hence, denotes the
maximum beneﬁts from trade when trade is costly
if all the beneﬁts from trade accrue to individual 2.
Likewise, the dashed light blue line is parallel to the
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solid dark blue line and, hence, denotes the max-
imum beneﬁts from trade when trade is costly if all
the beneﬁts accrue to individual 1.  The maximum
beneﬁts from trade are clearly less when trade is
costly and diminish as the cost of trade increase.
The important thing to note is that while the
precise gains from trade for the two individuals
depend on the respective size of the transactions
costs, costly trade reduces the range of exchange
ratios where trade is mutually advantageous and,
therefore, the volume of trade.  Moreover, the larger
the exchange costs, the smaller the region where
trade is mutually beneﬁcial.  Indeed, if the slopes
of the solid light blue and dark blue lines were suf-
ﬁciently large for either individual, no exchange
ratio would exist where trade would be mutually
advantageous—no trade would take place.5 Costly
trade reduces the feasible set of opportunities
where trade is mutually advantageous.
The exchange ratio at which individuals trade
and how much each beneﬁts from trade depends
on the relative costs of trade for both individuals,
which in turn depends on strategic considerations
that go well beyond the scope of this inquiry.  For
example, the above analysis assumed that the costs
were borne by both traders and that there were no
social arrangements for sharing the costs.  Moreover,
there is nothing in this analysis that ensures these
individuals trade or that more trade takes place if
the exchange costs are reduced.  The conclusion
that trade increases is inferred from noting that indi-
viduals have an incentive to engage in mutually
advantageous trade up to the point where the mar-
ginal resource cost-of-trade equals the utility gains
from trade.  Anything that reduces exchange costs
gives rise to this potential by expanding the feasible
set of mutually beneﬁcial trades.
The existence of exchange costs and the desire
to reduce them has implications for the develop-
ment of markets and, more generally, for their
structure.  Anything that reduces transactions cost
encourages greater trade and specialization.  At the
same time, the beneﬁts from specialization and
trade encourage the use of the most efﬁcient method
of exchange.  Of course, the catalyst for all of this is
the heterogeneity that makes trade mutually advan-
tageous.  Reducing the cost of trade enhances wel-






















5 Since trading costs are positively related to the real volume of the
goods traded, the rers will vary with the level of trade.  This makes
determining the exact amount of trade in costly trade environments
very difﬁcult.  Moreover, it has been assumed that the trade costs are
proportional to the volume of trade, but this need not be the case.
Trading costs also may vary across individuals or goods.  Regardless
of how exchange costs are treated, the same fundamental conclusion
emerges: The larger the exchange costs the less trade will take place.JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000      43
must be devoted to exchange, freeing up resources
for production (and/or leisure) and by (b) increasing
the amount of trade that takes place, i.e., increasing
the extent of the market.
A host of mechanisms have evolved to reduce
the cost of exchange: bazaars, trading posts, retail
establishments, brokers, agents, dealers, and other
specialists and, most especially, money.  Some of
these have given way to more efﬁcient methods of
exchange.  Others have not—at least not yet.
The effect of innovations, such as money,
which reduce the cost of exchange, is illustrated in
Figure 8.  Point A denotes the level of utility for an
individual who is self-sufﬁcient.  All time is spent
in production or leisure.  Point B denotes the level
of utility associated with costly trade.  The utility
level is higher than for autarky despite the fact that
some time, Le, is used for exchange.  Money reduces
exchange costs, so that fewer resources are devoted
to exchange, and there is more time for production (or
leisure).  This gain can be seen by comparing points
B and C.  In addition, the use of money increases
welfare by expanding the set of feasible transactions
and, thereby, increasing the volume of trade.  This
is illustrated by the difference between points C and
D.  The total gains from reducing exchange cost are
illustrated by the difference in utility levels associated
with points B and D.  Applying the same aggregation
analysis as before yields the implication that any
reduction in exchange cost is welfare enhancing 
for society as a whole.  This analysis makes it 
clear that by reducing the transaction cost, money
expands the set of exchange ratios where trade 
is mutually advantageous.  To this extent, the 
use of money expands the feasible set of
transactions.6
The Implications of Costly Trade
The objective of the above analysis was to 
illustrate a role of money and the beneﬁts from
money’s use, not to construct a general theory of
trade.  Indeed, the analysis says nothing about who
trades with whom or how much trade takes place.
Rather, it illustrates that trade is welfare enhancing
and that costly trade reduces welfare (relative to
costless trade), both by drawing resources from
production or leisure and by limiting the extent of
the markets.  Money increases economic welfare
by mitigating some of these costs.  Moreover, wel-
fare is enhanced even though money does not ap-
pear in the utility or production functions or is a
prerequisite for trade through a cash-in-advance















6 For the view that money does not increase the set of feasible transac-
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constraint; nor are there legal restrictions requiring
the use of money.  Furthermore, there is nothing to
rule out the possibility that some transactions are
achieved using barter or credit.  The analysis con-
ﬁrms Brunner and Meltzer’s argument (1971, p.
804) that “...the private and social productivity of
money are a direct consequence of the saving in
resources that the use of money permits and of the
extension of the market system that occurs because
of the reduction in the cost of making exchanges.”7
The conclusion that money enhances economic
welfare by reducing exchange costs is independent of
the market structure, so long as there is some degree
of decentralization.8 Of course, the exact nature and
extent of the beneﬁts from innovations that reduce
exchange costs depend on such factors.  Consequently,
any attempt to quantify the beneﬁts associated with
innovations that reduce exchange costs is necessarily
stylized: Speciﬁc results will depend on the assump-
tions made about the structure of markets, production
technologies, the nature and extent of the exchange
costs, and who bears them.  Since my purpose is to
gain insight into how money ameliorates exchange
costs, it is essential to deal with these costs very
generally.  Before turning attention to the issue of
exchange cost, however, several other implications
of the above analysis for money are noted.
First, innovations that reduce the exchange cost
of one individual can beneﬁt others.  This implica-
tion is clear from Figure 7.  Instead of both indi-
viduals experiencing a reduction in exchange cost,
assume that only one individual does.  The effect
still is to increase the feasible region of exchange
ratios where exchange could take place.  Conse-
quently, an innovation that reduces the exchange
cost of one individual can raise the utility of both.
Second, individuals have an incentive to use
the least-costly method of exchange.  The fact that
some form of money has evolved in every society
suggests that money is efﬁcient relative to other
methods of effecting trade.  Moreover, that similar
assets have functioned as money in very different
societies suggests that certain assets seem to have
a distinct advantage in reducing exchange costs.
Third, exchange costs limit the extent of trade and,
hence, specialization and the use of money reduces
these costs.  Consequently, it is not surprising that
the division and specialization of labor appear to
have evolved simultaneously with the use of money.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the wel-
fare gains from money can be obtained only by
comparing a monetary economy with an economy
that uses an alternative method of exchange.  More-
over, the welfare gains from money will change as
markets develop and economies become increas-
ingly specialized.  Consequently, the more highly spe-
cialized the economy and the greater the extent of
trade, the larger the likely effects of disruptions to the
supply of money will be.  As we will see, this point
has implications for the welfare costs of inﬂation.
It has been recognized for some time that econ-
omies with a medium of exchange are better off
than if no such medium of exchange exists.  Indeed,
McCallum (1983a, p. 24) uses “the traditional presump-
tion that an economy with a medium of exchange
is more productive than it would be if no medium
of exchange existed” to show that overlapping gen-
erations models of money (e.g., Wallace, 1983)
have no role for money as a medium of exchange.
The above analysis reﬁnes McCallum’s point by
explicitly showing how money necessarily enhances
welfare by facilitating trade.  Models that do not
explicitly recognize this role of money are unlikely
to capture money’s essential feature.9
7 Despite the large amount of resources devoted to market activity
(bringing buyers and sellers together) economic analyses have focused
on production and consumption.  For an exception, see Hirshleifer
(1973).
8Ostroy (1973) was one of the ﬁrst to observe that the Walrasian general
equilibrium market had no role for money because no trade takes
place until the equilibrium set of accounting prices Patinkin (1965), is
determined.  This is why Meltzer (1995), Hicks (1989), and others
argue that such models may be of limited use in understanding the
role of money in the economy.
9 Even models that explicitly capture the medium-of-exchange function
of money do not necessarily capture the welfare enhancing properties
of money noted here.  For example, the shopping-time model of
McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) or the money-in-exchange models
of Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973), Benhabib and Bull (1983), and
Fischer (1986) explicitly recognize the medium-of-exchange function.
In the latter models, however, the metric for measuring aggregate wel-
fare provides no motive for exchange.  In these models welfare is
measured by aggregate consumption, which is given by, 
where v(m) is the proportion of total output, f(k), that is used in
exchange.  Since C for v . 0 is always less than C for v = 0, exchange
does not enhance economic welfare.  Hence, there is no motive for
exchange and, consequently, no motive for money as a medium of
exchange.  The problem is analogous to that of Tobin (1965) and
Mundell (1971), where per-capita output is maximized when money
holdings are zero.
This is not true of the search-theoretic models of money (e.g.,
Jones, 1976; Oh, 1989; Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989, 1991, 1993; Trejos
and Wright, 1993; Johri, 1994) that explicitly model money’s role as a
medium of exchange.  In these models, money facilitates exchange by
ameliorating the search costs associated with the double coincidence of
wants essential for barter.  Implications of some of these models have
been born out experimentally (e.g., Duffy, 1998).
C f k v m
v v
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Before discussing why money exists and why
money dominates barter and credit as a medium of
exchange, one ﬁnal point should be made.  Speciﬁ-
cally, the welfare gains from money discussed above
are those associated with the real stock of money,
i.e., money’s purchasing power.  If money is held
solely to facilitate transactions, a larger real money
stock means that more transactions are facilitated
and, hence, the welfare gains are larger relative to
the next best method of exchange; therefore, soci-
ety’s welfare should increase with the equilibrium
stock of real money.  Changes in the nominal stock
of money, however, do not necessarily result in an
increase in the equilibrium stock of real money.
Given classical neutrality and Archibald and Lipsey’s
(1958) invariance principle, ceteris paribus, increases
in the stock of nominal money may have no signif-
icant effect on economic welfare.10
EXCHANGE COSTS WITH ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF EXCHANGE
The previous section showed why anything
that reduces the exchange cost is welfare enhancing.
Such innovations enhance welfare by reducing the
quantity of society’s scarce resources devoted to
exchange, freeing up resources, time for production,
or time for leisure, and by enabling society to achieve
a greater extent of specialization and trade.  I in-
ferred that money is one such innovation without
carefully deﬁning what money is.  This section takes
up this issue.  Speciﬁcally, money is deﬁned as a
commodity that is a generally acceptable medium
of exchange.
The essential feature of an exchange economy
is that individuals trade the commodity that they
have, commodity j, for one that they want, com-
modity k.  The essential point is that there are only
three possible methods of exchange: barter, money,
or credit.  In an exchange economy, trade must
take place with one of these methods.11 Which
of these methods is used depends on their relative
costs in effecting exchange.  Hence, the analysis of
money necessarily requires an analysis of the rela-
tive costs of barter, credit, and money in exchange.
In discussing the relative costs of these alterna-
tive methods of exchange, it is important to distin-
guish between simple barter (trading commodity j
for commodity k) and multistage or sequential
barter (trading commodity j for commodity h and
trading commodity h for commodity k).  Money
always entails a sequential transaction (trading
commodity j for m and trading m for commodity k).
Hence, a monetary transaction can be thought of
as a sequential barter transaction that involves a
particular commodity, m.  When m becomes gen-
erally acceptable, it is money.12
It also is important to distinguish between simple
and sequential credit transactions.  A simple credit
transaction involves trading commodity j for a prom-
ise of some commodity (k, j, m or some other
commodity) in the future.  Hence, a simple credit
transaction is just an intertemporal barter transaction.
A sequential credit transaction involves trading
commodity j for an IOU and trading the IOU for
commodity k or perhaps another IOU.13 According
to this deﬁnition, a sequential credit transaction is
a particular form of a sequential barter transaction
where the intermediate commodity is an IOU.  If a
particular IOU were generally acceptable, it would
be money.  Simple credit transactions have been used
to effect exchange for a long time, e.g., trade credit.
IOUs have even circulated as a form of local currency
for relatively short periods of time.  There are a number
of reasons, however, why money initially took the
form of tangible commodities and not IOUs.  Indeed,
I will argue later that the use of credit for the purpose
of facilitating trade is due to the existence of money.
Hence, while credit can supplement money in effecting
exchange, it will not supplant it.  In this section,
however, I only will consider the question of how
well credit can facilitate exchange.  For this
purpose, sequential credit is required.
It is important to distinguish between costs that
are independent of the method of exchange and those
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11McCallum (1985) has also made this point.
12In the search literature on money, general acceptability is achieved in
various ways.  For example, in Oh’s (1989) model where individuals
search randomly, a dominant medium of exchange emerges due to
the assumption that one commodity has the largest subjective proba-
bility of trade.  He shows that if traders try to minimize the number of
encounters that result in the desired trade, e.g., commodity j for com-
modity k, this commodity will emerge as the dominant medium of
exchange.  Money and barter coexist because barter occurs when an
individual who has commodity j and wants commodity k just hap-
pens to meet an individual with commodity k and who wants com-
modity j.
13Brunner and Meltzer (1971) consider what they termed a barter-credit
economy.  In their discussions, credit is simply bartered for goods.
That is, one person gives the other an IOU for the goods that the for-
mer wants.  But this implicitly assumes that the latter person wants
the IOU and not some other commodity that is desired for current
consumption.  The case where credit is used in barter transactions is
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that vary with the method of exchange.  That is, it is
essential to differentiate between costs that money
can ameliorate and those that it cannot.14 To this
end, exchange costs, i.e., all costs associated with
making the exchanges of two or more commodities
between two or more individuals, are categorized as
either information costs or noninformation costs.
Noninformation costs are the packaging, handling,
and other assorted costs associated with getting a com-
modity from the point of ﬁnal production to the point
of ﬁnal consumption.  Such costs are independent of
whether the transaction is achieved with barter, credit,
or money.  Hence, while such costs are essential for
determining the extent of and the beneﬁts from
trade, they are immaterial for the broader question
of why money is used and for determining the wel-
fare gains from its use.15
Information costs vary with the method of
exchange.  Information costs are divided into
assurance costs and shopping costs.  Comparisons
of the assurance costs associated with money,
barter, and credit explain why money dominates
sequential barter or sequential credit in exchange.
Comparisons of the shopping costs associated with
money, barter, and credit add to this explanation.
Assurance Costs
Consider ﬁrst the case of multistage transac-
tions.  This is when individuals trade a commodity
they have for one that they currently do not.  This
process will continue until they obtain the desired
commodity.  Such multistage transactions require
that individuals obtain assurance that they will be
able to obtain the desired commodity, k.  Broadly
speaking there are two distinct, although not mutu-
ally exclusive, categories of costs associated with
obtaining this assurance.  The ﬁrst of these I term
veriﬁcation costs.  Veriﬁcation costs, which are dis-
cussed extensively by Brunner and Meltzer (1971)
and Alchian (1977), are the costs of verifying the
characteristics and attributes of the good received.
These costs include the costs of inspection, mea-
suring, perfecting property rights, etc.16
The second category of costs I call value-deter-
mination costs.  Value-determination costs are the
costs associated with determining the value or
worth of the commodity received.  The value of the
commodity is the number of units of it that must
be traded for x units of the desired commodity, k.
Clearly, a poor-quality commodity is less valuable
than a high-quality commodity.  Nevertheless, know-
ing the quality of the product does not necessarily
mean that you know its exchange value, hence, it is
useful to treat these information costs as separate
and distinct.
A sequence of barter transactions that ulti-
mately leads to the acquisition of commodity k,
requires veriﬁcation costs at each stage in the se-
quence.17 Hence, the veriﬁcation costs associated
with sequential barter could be considerable, espe-
cially if a large number of intermediate transactions
are required.  Money economizes on veriﬁcation
costs relative to sequential barter for two reasons.
First, money has relatively low veriﬁcation costs.
Indeed, other things being the same, the commod-
ity with the lowest veriﬁcation cost will emerge as
money (Jevons,1875).18 Second, the use of money
means at most two transactions, j for m and m for k,
are required.
The veriﬁcation costs of sequential credit trans-
actions are likely to be high.  If one person exchanges
commodity j for an IOU of Mr. Smith, he has no
difﬁculty in verifying that this is the IOU of Mr. Smith;
after all, he watched Mr. Smith write it.19 When he
attempts to trade Mr. Smith’s IOU for commodity k,
however, the veriﬁcation costs for the next person
are likely to be signiﬁcant.  There may be consider-
able difﬁculty in verifying that this IOU is the prom-
ise of a particular Mr. Smith.20 Moreover, even if
14In this context, it is somewhat arbitrary to assume where production
ends and exchange begins; however, Hirshleifer (1973) suggests treat-
ing transportation costs as part of production costs.
15Of course, there could be second-order effects.  Speciﬁcally, an inno-
vation to the method of exchange could signiﬁcantly increase the
extent of the markets, which may in turn reduce transportation costs
if there were economies of scale in transportation.  Such innovations
also could foster innovations in the transportation industry.
16Alchian (1977, p. 134) argues that it is the low veriﬁcation costs alone
that make a commodity money.
17See Jones (1976), Oh (1989), Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Trejos
and Wright (1993).
18Jevons’ observation is explicitly modeled by Jones (1976) and Oh
(1989), who assume that one good is more in demand than other
goods.  Speciﬁcally, they take the “subjective expected transaction
costs”—the time spent searching for complimentary trading part-
ners—to be the number of encounters one anticipates before com-
pleting a single trade.
19Search-theoretic models abstract from the problem of credit by
assuming that chance meetings of individuals have a Poisson distribu-
tion, so that the probability of the same individuals meeting twice is
inﬁnitesimally small relative to the probability of meeting once.
20Of course, methods have been developed to deal with such veriﬁca-
tion costs, but the costs still may be rather high relative to the veriﬁ-
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one knew it was the IOU of a particular Mr. Smith,
one might not know Mr. Smith’s willingness and
ability to honor the obligation.  Even if the IOU is
collateralized, all subsequent holders of the IOU
must evaluate and perfect their interest in the col-
lateral.  Because of the costs associated with such
activities, it seems likely that the veriﬁcation costs
of sequential barter in IOUs will be higher than the
veriﬁcation costs of sequential barter in commodi-
ties.  Consequently, if money has lower veriﬁcation
costs than sequential barter, it must have lower ver-
iﬁcation costs than sequential credit as well.
The individual also must determine the value
of the commodity, i.e., the number of units of the
commodity k (or h) that they can get for x-units of
the commodity j.  The value-determination costs 
of sequential barter are high because it requires
that the individual know up to Q(Q 2 1)/2 relative
prices.  The problem associated with a multitude 
of prices is exacerbated if credit is used to effect
trade.  Credit instruments can be denominated 
in any one of the Q commodities for any one of 
the N individuals.  Hence, the credit price of a
commodity can vary across goods and individuals.
Credit prices also can differ in other dimensions,
such as the maturity of the contract, whether 
there is collateral and the nature and extent of 
the collateral.  Given problems associated with
asymmetric information, it seems that the cost 
of determining the value of IOUs is so high that it
eliminates the possibility that a credit instrument—
denominated in a nonmoney asset—could serve 
as an effective, generally acceptable medium of
exchange, i.e., it could serve as money.21 Money
has signiﬁcantly lower value-determination costs
than either sequential barter or sequential credit
because traders are required to know at most 
Q 2 1 money prices.
Value-determination costs also depend on the
variability of the value of money.  All other things
being the same, money serves best as a medium of
exchange when its value remains relatively stable.
Because of the difﬁculty in determining the relative
value of commodities, it would be surprising to
ﬁnd that a commodity whose value ﬂuctuates con-
siderably—relative to other commodities—serves
as a generally accepted medium of exchange, i.e.,
serves as money.
Maintaining the stability of money’s value over
long periods of time is important for what Jevons
(1875, pp. 5-6) called the standard of value function
of money.  Because of money’s role as a medium of
exchange, and hence a source of generalized pur-
chasing power, it is convenient to denominate credit
contracts in terms of money.  That is, the existence of
money facilitates the use of credit.  Indeed, as Hoover
(1988) has noted, and I will argue later in more detail,
money appears to be essential for credit.  Variation in
the value of money can have a signiﬁcant, detrimental
effect on money’s standard of value function.22 I
will argue later that this effect may be larger than
the effect of variation in the value of money on
money’s function as a medium of exchange.
Shopping Costs
If an individual who has commodity j and
wants commodity k runs into an individual who
has commodity k and wants commodity j, is the
result necessarily barter?  Some insights into the
answer to this question come from considering
shopping costs.  Shopping costs are of particular
interest because these are the costs that money is
ordinarily thought to ameliorate relative to simple
barter.  Shopping costs encompass a wide variety
of costs, including costs associated with locating a
seller or buyer, haggling over price, budgeting, and
planning expenditures.  Shopping costs that are of
particular interest are those associated with the
lack of a double coincidence of wants and those
associated with not having a common unit of
account.  While the medium of exchange and unit
of account functions are separable, the fact that most
often the same good has performed both functions
suggests that this arrangement is efﬁcient.
Trade is a planned activity.  Sellers seek buyers
and buyers seek sellers.  Trade that occurs as the
result of chance meetings is rare.23 Indeed, special-
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have to be denominated in something other than money.  Moreover,
it should be clear from this discussion that credit is less likely to arise
as a general method of trading goods in primitive economies, where
the costs of acquiring information are relatively high.  Credit is more
likely to exist as the primary method of exchange in advanced soci-
eties where information costs are relatively low.
22Jevons (1875, p. 6 and p. 12).
23In the search-theoretic literature, e.g., Jones (1976), Oh (1989),
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), and Trejos and Wright (1993), trade
results from chance encounters.  In such settings, money arises
because it minimizes the costs of transactions due to a double coinci-
dence of wants.  Traders bump into each other randomly and engage
in simple barter if there is a double coincidence of wants, they trade
goods for money if one of the traders has money, or they do nothing.
Recently, search models of money have allowed for the development
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ists who are particularly efﬁcient at verifying and
determining the value of particular products arise.
In some cases, these specialists make markets for
speciﬁc commodities by dealing in them.  Match-
ing buy and sell orders and managing inventories 
is difﬁcult if a whole host of commodities is traded
for the commodity(s) that the specialist deals in.
Hence, the specialist’s function is more efﬁcient if
transactions are carried out in a single commodity.
Efﬁciency is further enhanced if bid (offers to buy)
and ask (offers to sell) prices are quoted in this
same commodity.
The efﬁciency of the market is increased if 
all participants agree to use the same medium 
of exchange and if this commodity also serves 
as the unit of account.24 The elimination of the
double coincidence of wants reduces the time 
for buyers and sellers to locate each other.  Money
also reduces the time spent haggling over price 
if everyone agrees to quote prices in the same 
commodity and if that commodity is accepted 
generally in exchange.  For analogous reasons,
planning and budgeting are made easier if a single
commodity is used as both the medium of exchange
and the unit of account.
Let us now reconsider the intriguing question
that began this section: If an individual who has
commodity j and wants commodity k runs into an
individual who has commodity k and wants com-
modity j, is the result necessarily barter? In the
search-theoretic literature of money (e.g., Jones,
1976; Oh, 1989; Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993; and
Trejos and Wright, 1993), the answer is unequiv-
ocal.  Yes!  In these models, money and barter
coexist because chance encounters sometimes
result in a double coincidence of wants.  The
scarcity of barter is related inversely to the proba-
bility of such encounters.  In economies where
monetary exchange is well established, however,
barter is scarce because seeking a double coinci-
dence of wants becomes increasingly inefﬁcient
with the increased use of money and specialization
(Jevons, 1875, p. 3).  Individuals who possibly
could barter might bump into each other and never
know it.  Furthermore, they would not care.  In
highly specialized monetary economies, barter is
motivated more by tax considerations or thin mar-
kets for peculiar goods (such as second-hand
goods—goods become more heterogeneous as they 
get used—e.g., trading a used car in on the
purchase of a new car) rather than by chance
encounters.
Why Is Money Held?
The above analysis explains why money is the
most efﬁcient method of effecting transactions, it
does not explain why money is held.  The classical
explanation of why money is held deals with the
lack of synchronization of receipts and expendi-
tures.  Brunner and Meltzer (1971, p. 785, fn. 4)
challenged this view, arguing
It is easy to see why a “lack of
synchronization” does not imply that
money is used and held. Consider an
economy that has neither a medium of
exchange nor money.  If there are no costs
of acquiring information, differences in the
timing of receipts and payments are adjusted
by issuing verbal promises in exchange for
goods and, later, delivering goods.  More
generally, in a barter-credit economy, com-
mitments or promises to pay bridge the gap
between receipts and payments.
Brunner and Meltzer are correct that the lack
of synchronization does not explain why money is
held and they also are correct in suggesting that
costly information explains money’s dominance in
exchange.  Money is held for only one reason—by
its very nature the process of exchange takes time
so that anything that functions as a medium of
exchange must be held.  This is so obvious that
Brunner and Meltzer (1971, p. 804) refer to it as
“trivial.”  Trivial though it is, this fact alone is sufﬁ-
cient to explain why money is held.  While econ-
omists have dealt with time in a number of ways,
it is convention to refer to things that are measured
as a point in time as stocks and things that are mea-
sured through time as ﬂows.  Out of necessity,
money is a stock.  If the stock of money facilitates
the ﬂow of trade, it must exist before and after the
trade takes place.  In a barter economy, the goods that
are traded in the interval from t to t 1 1 must exist
at time t.  If, hypothetically, trade and consumption
are permitted to occur simultaneously, consumption
goods bartered at time t do not exist at t 1 1.  In
the case of money (or sequential barter or credit),
24Niehans (1978) has argued that the medium-of-exchange and unit-of-
account functions are wedded because money cannot ameliorate the
pricing problem noted above unless money also is the unit of account.
The wedding of the medium-of-exchange and unit-of-account func-
tions enhances market efﬁciency also has been noted by White (1984,
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however, this is not the case.  The nominal quantity
of money held at t 1 1 must be the same as that
held at t.  Hence, although money is continuously
changing hands, it always is being held by someone
—it is never consumed.  This is not solely a charac-
teristic of money; it is true of any asset.25 Assets
traded at time t exist at both t and at t 1 1.
What then distinguishes money from any other
asset?  Ipso facto every asset is a store of wealth.  To
say money is a store of wealth is tautological!  Being
a store of wealth is not a deﬁning characteristic of
money or any other asset.26 Money can be distin-
guished only from other assets by applying
another criterion.27 The important criterion for
separating money from other assets is that money
is an asset (or group of assets) that is generally
acceptable as the means of trading goods—other
assets are not.  This characteristic distinguishes
money from other assets and has a long tradition
in classical monetary economics (e.g., Menger, 1892;
Jevons, 1875; Brunner and Meltzer, 1971; and
McCallum, 1983a, b, 1985).  At different times and
under different circumstances various assets have
served as money.  Nevertheless, some assets appear
to have characteristics that have made them the
predominant forms of money.
Money is distinguished from other assets by
the function it performs; this is illustrated by a
simple story from Jevons (1875):
When Mr. Wallace was traveling in the
Malay Archipelago, he seems to have suf-
fered rather from the scarcity than the super-
abundance of provisions.  In his most inter-
esting account of his travels, he tells us that
in some of the islands, where there was no
proper currency, he could not procure sup-
plies for dinner without special bargain,
and much chaffering upon each occasion.
If the vendor of ﬁsh or other coveted eata-
bles did not meet with the sort of exchange
desired, he would pass on, and Mr. Wallace
and his party had to go without their dinner.
It therefore became very desirable to keep
on hand a supply of articles, such as knives,
pieces of cloth, arrack, or sago cakes, to
multiply the chance that one or other article
would suit the itinerant merchant.  (pp. 2-3).
The Wallace party undoubtedly kept a cache
of articles that were most highly demanded by the
natives.  These articles are clearly stores of wealth,
but the party’s members would normally not have
chosen to store their wealth in this form.  Rather,
these particular articles were held because they
facilitated trade, i.e., because they reduced transac-
tion costs.  The Wallace party used these articles as
a form of local currency.  Whether an asset can be
used as money depends solely on whether it gener-
ally is held to facilitate exchange.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that money is
unique among assets not solely because it facili-
tates the exchange of goods for consumption.
Money also facilitates the exchange of other non-
money assets as well.  Individuals typically do not
exchange shares of stock for acres of land even
when the person who has land wants stock and
vice versa.  Rather, land is traded for money and
the money for stock.  More importantly, it is gener-
ally convenient to denominate credit contracts in
units of money rather than bushels of wheat, acres
of land, or other commodities or assets.  Generally
speaking, assets are held for the myriad of reasons
that individuals accumulate wealth.  In contrast,
money is primarily held because of its low cost in
effecting transactions.  Money is distinguished from
other assets in that it is the only asset that is a gen-
erally held medium of exchange.  Because of this, it
also is the standard of value.
ISSUES IN MONETARY THEORY
The above analysis has implications for several
interesting issues in monetary theory such as the
origins of ﬁat money, the asset demand for money,
the relationship between money and credit, the
buffer-stock notion of money demand, the welfare
beneﬁts of money, and the welfare costs of inﬂation.
I will now discuss each of these issues in turn.
Fiat Money
Until now, money implicitly has been a tangible
real commodity, i.e., a commodity money, or a claim
to such.  In modern monetary economies, however,
money is typically paper currency with no intrinsic
value.  A question that has troubled monetary econ-
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omists is why do people hold an asset that is value-
less except in exchange?  The answer suggested
here is that money is the only asset that provides
exchange services that other assets cannot provide.28
A better question is why have all monetary
economies evolved into ﬁat money economies?
The answer to this question arises naturally from
the framework presented here.  In the analysis pre-
sented above, I implicitly assumed that commodity
money is costless to produce and/or to maintain.
This is not the case.  Commodity monies require
that resources be used in their production and to
maintain the stock.  In the case of commodity
monies like precious metals, most of the costs are
production costs (the maintenance costs, i.e., depreci-
ation, are fairly low).  In the case of more abstract
commodity monies, like checkable deposits, the
costs are on going, and are related to the extent
of their use.29 Indeed, even paper currency is not
costless to produce and maintain.30
Because the production/maintenance of money
requires the use of economic resources, the welfare
gains associated with the use of resource-using money
are necessarily smaller than if money were costless.
If money production requires resources, augmenting
the stock means that resources will be drawn, at least
temporarily, from other uses.  The nominal money
stock (e.g., tons of gold or silver) will increase as long
as the marginal exchange value of the last unit pro-
duced exceeds its marginal production cost.  If there
are maintenance costs, (e.g., the rate of physical
depreciation is positive), then resource-using money
will be less welfare enhancing because of higher
maintenance costs.  Because the veriﬁcation costs
are likely to be higher the more rapidly and less
predictably an asset depreciates, there is an incen-
tive to choose as money commodities that have a
low, perhaps negligible, rate of depreciation.  That
is, all other things being the same, the asset with
the lowest maintenance cost will serve as money.
For these reasons, society has an incentive to
replace high-cost commodity money with lower
cost money.  One step in this evolution was to
replace commodity money with lower cost repre-
sentative money.  A further step is to replace repre-
sentative money with even lower cost ﬁat money.
Because ﬁat money requires fewer resources for
production and maintenance, its use is welfare
enhancing.  In addition, if ﬁat money were to fur-
ther reduce transactions costs, social welfare could
be further enhanced if specialization and trade
were encouraged.
Despite its advantages over resource-using
money, ﬁat money evolved slowly over a consider-
able period of time.  Money’s evolution was undoubt-
edly affected by wars, other political events, and
difﬁculties associated with regulating the supply of
various commodity monies. Nevertheless, the fact
that ﬁat money increases society’s welfare relative
to commodity money suggests the evolution to ﬁat
money is the result of economic forces rather than
the happenstance of a number of noneconomic
events (Russell, 1991).
Governments issue ﬁat money because private
fiat money issuers have an incentive to issue money
as long as the marginal value of the last nominal
unit issued is greater than its production cost. Con-
sequently, it would be difﬁcult for private money
issuers to make a credible commitment not to over
issue ﬁat money, so as to make it “worthless” (e.g.,
Ritter, 1995).31 Moreover, only the government can
credibly commit to distribute the seigniorage revenue
from money’s creation.  Seigniorage arises when
the exchange value of the money issued exceeds
money’s production cost.
The existence of a money whose value in ex-
change exceeds its production cost has given rise
to the notion that society’s wealth exceeds the stock
of tangible assets by the real value of ﬁat money
held.  As Tobin (1965, p. 676) put it:
...as viewed by the inhabitants of the nation
individually, wealth exceeds the tangible
capital stock by the size of what we might
call the ﬁduciary issue.  This is an illusion,
but only one of the many fallacies of com-
position which are basic to any economy
or any society.
Many economists accept Tobin’s claim that the
“wealth” associated with the real stock of ﬁat money
is illusionary, but this proposition is erroneous.
Tobin’s error comes from viewing a monetary econ-
28See Tobin (1992, p. 774) for the traditional answer to this question.
29Thornton (1983) shows that the relevant issue for determining whether
“inside money” is part of a society’s stock of net wealth is whether
there are resource costs involved in its production and maintenance.
30The United States is issuing another in a series of dollar coins.  The
purpose of these coins is to reduce the cost of maintaining the stock
of currency, since coins depreciate less rapidly than paper money.
31Goodhart (1998) suggests that gold’s role as a medium of exchange
was greatly enhanced by government’s use of gold to pay tributes or
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omy as simply a barter economy with money.  In
so doing, he fails to recognize the private and public
beneﬁts that accrue from money’s use.  The beneﬁts
from the use of money naturally accrue to ﬁat money
when society shifts from using a more costly com-
modity money to a less costly (or, ideally, completely
costless) ﬁat money.  Hypothetically, if resource-
using money were replaced unit-for-unit with ﬁat
money, the real value of the stock of ﬁat money
would reﬂect the welfare beneﬁts associated with
the previously held stock of commodity money.
Hence, the beneﬁts of commodity money are em-
bodied fully in the same real quantity of ﬁat money.32
Furthermore, the fact that all of the beneﬁts
from the previous stock of money would be obtained
at lower cost guarantees that welfare is enhanced
by the switch, even if there is no further reduction
in the marginal transaction cost and, consequently,
no further increase in trade and specialization.
Because of the existence of positive external-
ities associated with money’s use, it is inappropriate
to equate the welfare beneﬁts of money with the
real value of the money stock, i.e., M/P, as is frequent-
ly done.  Nevertheless, it is clear that including the
real value of the “ﬁduciary issue” as part of society’s
net wealth is not an illusion.  Some time ago, Clower
(1967) pointed out the dangers of treating monetary
economies as if they were analytically equivalent
to barter economies.  In a similar vein, Coase (1960)
argues that when a comparison of economies with
alternative social arrangements is made, it is essen-
tial to consider the total effect.  The true beneﬁts of
ﬁat money only can be obtained by comparing a
ﬁat money economy with a commodity money
economy or with barter or credit economies.  The
conclusion that the wealth associated with the real
quantity of ﬁat money is illusionary emerges from
a naive comparison of a ﬁat money economy with
an economy where all of a sudden no one uses or
holds money but nothing else changes.
Money and Credit as Media of Exchange
The world is dominated by monetary economies;
however, this does not mean that transactions are
not carried out using barter or credit.  In monetary
economies, all three methods of effecting exchange
are used.  Indeed, money may not be used to ini-
tiate most transactions.  For example, when one
considers every extension of trade credit or the
transfer of goods by credit card, it is arguably the
case that more transactions are carried out initially
with credit than with cash or checks.  Given the
large and increasing use of credit in effecting trans-
actions, how can one reasonably argue that this is
a monetary economy and not a credit economy?
Let us begin this discussion by trying to answer
the intriguing question: Could there be a pure credit
economy with no medium of exchange?  A pure
credit economy may have been what Brunner and
Meltzer (1971) had in mind when they argued that
the problem of synchronizing payments and receipts
could be achieved by making verbal promises. To
see what such a world might look like, I will assume
that not only is there perfect information, but that
all individuals’ promises are fully credible, i.e., no
person makes a promise that cannot be kept.33 In
such a world, individual A could give individual B
commodity j in exchange for a promise to receive
commodity j or some other commodity at a later
date.  This world would be very complicated.  For
example, assume that individual A sells his labor
services to Firm F for the promise from F to pay a
certain quantity of commodity j at week’s end.
Individual A then buys the goods that he needs by
promising to deliver j or some other commodity
at some point in the future or by transferring part
of Firm F’s promise to deliver commodity j.  Of
course, it is not necessary that these promises change
hands per se, it could be that some centralized
accountant keeps track of all promises made to and
from all parties, or everyone could simply have a
perfect memory.34
If promises were denominated in all possible
commodities, quantities, and future dates, the problem
of calculating the prices in this economy would be
extremely difﬁcult.  The pricing problem could be
signiﬁcantly reduced (and the accounting sim-
pliﬁed) if individuals agree to denominate all credit
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that there were utility or output gains associated with the use of money.
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who have suggested that transactions could be carried out without the
use of money are Black (1970), and Greenﬁeld and Yeager (1983).  See
McCallum (1985) and White (1984) for analyses of these models.
34Kocherlakota (1998) suggests that ﬁat money is “merely a physical
way of maintaining this balance sheet.” Hence, he suggests that
money is merely memory.  He even suggests that his approach “repre-
sents an advance over the usual justiﬁcations for the existence of
money: Money is a store of value, money is a medium of exchange
and/or money is a unit account...After all, money does not allow soci-
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contracts in the same commodity.  This would give
rise to this commodity being a medium of exchange,
however.  For example, if all credits are denominated
in m, it must be the case that a credit instrument
worth z units of commodity m today must trade for
z units of m itself.  This means that individuals
with m could simply trade it for the commodities
they desire just as well as they could trade credit
instruments denominated in m.  If a credit
instrument denominated in m facilitates trade, then
so too must commodity m—m would be money.35
It could be that m is bulky, like a barrel of oil,
so that it could not circulate hand-to-hand.36 The
promises themselves would be inconvenient, how-
ever, because longer-term contracts would have to
be discounted relative to shorter-term contracts.
This difﬁculty could be overcome by issuing non-
interest-bearing sight drafts denominated in the
common unit of account, i.e., currency.37 In this
case, a credit economy would give rise to money.
It could be, however, that the commodity is
completely abstract, like a quark.  Hence, we would
have a pure credit, nonmonetary, exchange econ-
omy where all credit contracts are denominated in
a unit of account, whose only function is to deter-
mine the price level (Fama, 1983).  People, however,
only would accept promises denominated in some-
thing abstract or something that they did care to
hold if they were certain that they would be able to
exchange these promises for the commodities they
desire.  Hence, that would demand that credit con-
tracts be denominated in things that they value or
are certain that they would be easily converted into
other commodities.
Note the similarity between the world I have
just described and the one that exists today.  Our
money is called the dollar.  Congress adopted the
dollar (and the decimal system) as our unit of cur-
rency in 1785.  Alexander Hamilton’s coinage recom-
mendation establishing the U.S. dollar as 270 grains,
11/12 ﬁne of gold or 416 grains, 0.89242 ﬁne of
silver was not adopted until April 1792.38 Because
of the inconvenience of carrying gold or silver, sight
drafts were issued in convenient denominations.
These claims on the U.S. stocks of gold and silver
circulated in lieu of the commodities themselves.
Over the years the dollar has been redeﬁned.  U.S.
currency now is just a claim on the same quantity
of U.S. currency.  That is, we now have a pure paper
currency standard.  People are willing to hold intrin-
sically useless pieces of paper and claims that are
denominated in intrinsically useless pieces of paper
because they are certain that other individuals will
accept the same.  Collectively, the people agree to
maintain the paper’s value by limiting its issuance
and to share the seigniorage.39
The above analysis also reinforces why it is
efﬁcient to have credit contracts denominated in
the same commodity, and better still if this com-
modity is money.  Jevons (1875) termed this the
standard of value of money.  The point to empha-
size is that money facilitates the use of credit just
as it facilitates the trade of consumable commodi-
ties and tangible assets, (e.g., savings deposits are
exchanged for dollars that are used to purchase
bonds).  Consequently, while credit ﬁgures promi-
nently in many transactions, the analysis presented
above makes it clear why credit almost never is used
sequentially for other transactions and why the adop-
tion of a commodity medium of exchange has tended
to precede credit arrangements, and not the other
way around.40
Can credit instruments function as money?  The
answer is yes.  They can and they have.  Checkable
deposits (or electronic transfers of funds) are the
liabilities of the entities who hold the balances.41
As such, they are promises to pay dollars upon de-
mand.  Such balances are included in measures of
transactions money not only because they facilitate
exchange, but also because ﬁnancial institutions
are committed to exchanging these deposits for
cash immediately and at a ﬁxed one-to-one ratio.
This is what Pesek and Saving (1967) termed the
35Hoover (1988) has made this point in a similar fashion to argue
against Fama’s (1980) “new monetary economics.”
36Fama (1980, 1983) eliminated the possibility that what he termed the
“numeraire—unit of account” would circulate as money by assuming
that it was a “barrel of oil.”  Note that this was not a necessary conse-
quence of his model, but assumed.  Hence, Fama did not establish
that there would be no commodity that would circulate as a medium
of exchange, rather he assumed it.
37In addition, there may be a problem with the denominations of such
contracts. Indeed, Russell (1991) notes that both of these problems
were drawbacks to bills of exchange circulating as currency during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.
38The mint began to coin silver in October 1794 and gold in July 1795,
but a mistake by the ﬁrst mint director resulted in coins of 9/10 ﬁne.
See Studenski and Krooss (1952) for more details.
39See McCallum (1985) for other ways of achieving price-level determi-
nacy under a currency standard.
40Bagehot (1873) makes this point with respect to the origins of bank
credit.
41See Goodfriend (1991) for a good discussion of the evolution of 
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instant repurchase clause.  As long as the commit-
ment is fully credible, such deposits and currency
substitute perfectly.  In this case, it is sensible to
add such commitments to the stock of cash and
call the sum the stock of money.  Indeed, this is
what is done.
Finally, it is worth noting that the increased use
and availability of credit might mitigate the effects
of disruptions to the supply of money, at least in
the short run.  In economies where the credit mar-
ket is not well developed, a negative shock to the
money supply may have a more immediate effect
on output and/or prices than in an economy where
individuals and businesses can not only readily
borrow against their future income but can make
transactions without having money immediately
available.  In addition, as more transactions are ini-
tiated with the use of credit, the stock of money
necessary to support a given level of commodity
transactions could diminish, i.e., the velocity of
money could rise.  It should be remembered, how-
ever, that ﬁnancial transactions also require the use
of money.  In any event, it is reasonable to speculate
that the relationship between money and output
and money and prices is likely to change as ﬁnan-
cial markets develop and mature.
The Asset Demand for Money
The asset demand for money has been associ-
ated with two literatures.  The ﬁrst deals with demand
for money as an asset and focuses on the interest
elasticity of the demand for money.  The second
focuses on whether money should be deﬁned to
include non-medium-of-exchange assets.  Money’s
essential function is to facilitate transactions.  Hence,
while it is appropriate to consider the effect of close
substitutes for money on its demand, it is inappro-
priate to deﬁne money to include such non-medium-
of-exchange assets.42
The asset demand for money focused attention
on holding money for asset purposes, just like you
hold any other asset.  I will argue, however, that
the asset demand for money is inconsequential.43
The asset demand for money has its origins with
Lavington (1968), but was most inﬂuentially ad-
vanced by Keynes.  If money was held primarily
as an asset, its demand should be quite sensitive
to changes in interest rates, because the nominal
return to holding money is zero.
If money is primarily a medium of exchange,
however, the interest elasticity of money demand
might be quite low.  To see why, I note that Brunner
and Meltzer (1971) begin their seminal work on
money by noting that money remains in circula-
tion even during periods of high and accelerating
inﬂation.  They argue that this fact “calls into ques-
tion the relevance of treating money as an asset that
provides little or no return.”44 The analysis of why
individuals continue to use money during periods
of high and accelerating inﬂation presented here is
complementary with theirs.  Money continues to
function as a medium of exchange even under con-
ditions of severe or hyperinﬂation because it enjoys
a signiﬁcant cost advantage over both barter and
credit as a medium of exchange.  Indeed, this advan-
tage is likely to be so large that it would take an ex-
treme increase in the holding cost to induce indi-
viduals to shift to the widespread use of either barter
or credit to facilitate exchange.  Moreover, the cost
advantage of money increases as economies become
increasingly specialized and dependent on exchange.
The advantage also increases as payments practices
become increasingly institutionalized.45
The point is that a large discontinuity exists be-
tween money and the next best alternative for
exchange.  Economists normally think of continuous
functions where small changes induce individuals
to switch from one alternative to another.  No such
continuum of media of exchange exists, however.
Money so dominates barter and credit as a medium of
exchange that it continues to serve as a medium of
exchange despite very large increases in the cost of
holding it.  Jevons (1875, p. 6) was aware of this, stating:
...even if the medium of exchange varied
considerably in value, people would go on
making their payments in terms of it, as if
there had been no variation, some gaining
at the expense of others.
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ing money.
43McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) also have suggested the asset demand
for money should be relatively inconsequential, stating that money “will
also serve as a store of value, of course, but may be of minor importance
to the economy in that capacity.”  They do not elaborate on why this
should be so, however.
44Brunner and Meltzer (1971, p. 784).
45Wallace (1983) has emphasized one of these institutional features;
namely, the legal restriction that currency is legal tender.  Overlapping
generations models focus on the store of value function of money, i.e.,
money’s function as an asset (e.g., McCallum, 1983; and McCallum
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The discontinuity between money and other
means of exchange suggests that the demand for
the medium of exchange may be rather insensitive
to changes in its holding cost.
The key observation is the degree of substi-
tutability between money and other assets is that
the substitution is unidirectional: While money is
an asset (or group of assets) that provides a partic-
ular function that other assets do not provide, at
times, money may be held for the same reasons
that other assets are held—the asset that normally
serves as money also is now being held as a store
of wealth.  It is never the case, however, that other
assets are held for the reason that money is pri-
marily held.  This means that when rapid and
accelerating inﬂation signiﬁcantly increases the
cost of holding money it will not be a simple matter
for other assets to substitute for it, i.e., become
money.  The most individuals can do is to economize
on their money holdings along the lines suggested
by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).  Since other
assets dominate money in their ability to transfer
wealth through time, however, individuals have a
strong incentive to economize on their holdings of
money for transactions purposes even when the
returns to other stores of wealth are low.
Nevertheless, it is possible to envision circum-
stances where the return on real assets is so low
that some individuals choose to hold money for
the same reason they normally hold other assets.
Indeed, classical economists, including Keynes,
were concerned about the consequences of hoard-
ing money.  Given the observed stickiness of prices,
they argued that hoarding money would have sig-
niﬁcant consequences for the real economy.
Hoarding money by individuals seems more
likely, however, in economies with relatively poorly
developed ﬁnancial markets.46 If few alternatives
to holding wealth are readily available, more indi-
viduals may opt to hoard money, especially during
times of economic or ﬁnancial uncertainty.  The
more sophisticated and well developed the ﬁnancial
system becomes, however, the less likely it is that in-
dividuals will choose to hold money as an asset, even
when nominal interest rates are extremely low.47
Keynes’ notion of the asset demand for money
focused the attention of monetary economists on
the interest sensitivity of money demand.  The in-
terest sensitivity of money demand has been exten-
sively investigated, with a wide array of results
(e.g., Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990; and Laidler, 1993).
The amount of money held for transactions
purposes depends on the planned volume of trans-
actions.  This, in turn, depends on the timing of
receipts and payments, which are affected by the
degree of specialization and the structure of the
markets, as well as the size, extent, and activity in
credit markets, etc.  Changes in the opportunity
cost of holding money will induce individuals to
economize on their holdings of money balances,
but the degree to which they do this depends on
the size of the gain relative to the marginal cost of
the economizing activity.  Given that money hold-
ings are typically a small part of an individuals’
wealth and that individuals have a strong incentive
to minimize their holding of money at any nonzero
nominal interest rate, it would not be surprising to
ﬁnd a relatively low interest responsiveness of
money demand.  Indeed, empirical investigations
of currency demand (e.g., Hess, 1971; and Dotsey,
1988), which has a zero nominal return and is held
primarily for transactions purposes, suggest that
the interest elasticity of currency demand is zero.48
Other mediums of exchange that pay an implicit or
explicit interest may be held, in part, for the same
reasons individuals hold other assets, so that the
demand for them is likely to be more sensitive to
changes in their relative holding cost.
The Buffer-Stock Notion of the Demand for Money
The idea that there is no close substitute for
money as a medium of exchange is complemen-
tary with the buffer-stock notion of money demand.
In the buffer-stock theory (Laidler, 1984, 1987), hold-
ings of real balances substitute for costly infor-
mation and uncertainty.  Individuals absorb shocks
to their real money holdings due to a shock to their
nominal money balances.  Over time, nominal
money holdings are adjusted to a level more consis-
tent with individuals’ demand for real money balances,
given the level of nominal interest rates, the level
46Unfortunately, Keynes attempted to rationalize hoarding at a time
when ﬁnancial markets were well developed.  Hence, it was difﬁcult to
explain why individuals held money when there were assets that had
all of the same risk characteristics of money but yielded a positive
rate of return (Barro and Fischer, 1976).
47It is usually assumed that zero is a lower bound for the nominal inter-
est rate because individuals could simply hold money that bears a
zero nominal return.  This analysis too ignores the costs of acquiring
and storing money.  See Thornton (1999).
48Furthermore, most studies ﬁnd a remarkably low substitutability
between currency and transactions deposits, suggesting that these
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and pattern of current income and expenditures and
expectations of future nominal interest rates, income
and expenditures, etc.  The buffer-stock notion im-
plies that individuals will not change their holdings
of real money balances immediately when nominal
interest rates, real income, or prices change.
Because other assets cannot perform money’s
function as a medium of exchange, I speculate that
individuals respond more quickly to reductions in
the real money balances due to negative nominal
money shocks (or positive price-level shocks) than
they do to increases caused by positive money shocks
(or negative price-level shocks).  For example, when
there is a positive aggregate nominal money shock,
individuals may hold these balances temporarily
rather than spending them for goods and services
or purchasing other assets.  If this were to happen,
there would be no immediate adjustment of
output, employment, prices, or interest rates.  On
the other hand, since individuals cannot substitute
for money, negative aggregate shocks may affect eco-
nomic behavior directly and more quickly.
The Welfare Beneﬁts of Money
The usual approach to assessing the welfare
beneﬁts of money is to assume that money is like
other assets; for instance, shoes or cars.  In the case
of these assets, the beneﬁts accrue only to the con-
sumer so the welfare gains can be obtained by simply
summing up the so-called Harberger triangles.  It
is well known that this approach fails when there
are signiﬁcant social externalities. Since I have ar-
gued that there are signiﬁcant social beneﬁts from
money—because of the role it plays in expanding
the size and extent of the markets for goods and
credit, and the degree of specialization—this ap-
proach cannot possibly work.  Indeed, it seems
reasonable to speculate that the social beneﬁts
of money could eclipse its private beneﬁts.
Unlike many innovations, it is virtually impos-
sible to internalize the beneﬁts from using money.
This further enhances the idea that there is signiﬁ-
cant social beneﬁt to money.  Indeed, once the
usefulness of money is recognized, the one who
recognizes it has an incentive to share the insight
with others, as my parable of the trader illustrates.
The Parable of the Trader
There was a producer who once every period
loaded some of his produce on a wagon and
went to a destination where he and other pro-
ducers would meet to trade their wares.  One
day, the producer noticed that there was
one good, g, that nearly everyone wanted and
would exchange goods for g.  Realizing that
he can buy virtually any good he desired
using g, he offers to take g for the goods he
was trying to trade.  Initially he does this
only when the double coincidence of wants
necessary for barter is lacking.  He soon
discovers, however, that trading in g is much
faster and easier than searching out barter
opportunities, so he stops seeking barter
opportunities and his barter transactions
become increasingly infrequent.  By trad-
ing his wares for g, and g for the goods that
he desires, this producer discovers that he
can accomplish the desired trading in a frac-
tion of the time that he had previously spent.
Now he could attempt to internalize the
gain from his private knowledge (no one
else has made this observation yet) by
offering to tell others how they could save
trading time for a fee.  He realizes, however,
that no one would pay for this information
because all they have to do is observe him
and they, too, would know the secret.  More
important, he realizes that he could further
shorten his trading time if the others be-
haved as he.  Hence, rather than keeping
this information private and attempting to
internalize the beneﬁt from his superior
information, the trader has an incentive to
make the information public.  In so doing,
however, not only does he gain by short-
ening the transactions time, but others do
as well.
As Laidler (1990, p. 48) puts it, “one agent’s
cash balances produce services not just for that
agent then but for all other agents with whom his
market activities bring him into contact.”  The use
of money that facilitates the trade of one agent
facilitates the trade of all agents.  In addition, the
reduction in individuals’ exchange cost associated
with money’s use causes markets to ﬂourish.  In-
creased trade promotes greater specialization, greater
dependence on trade, and a greater need for and
use of money, and so on, and so forth.
The synergy among trade, money, and spe-
cialization makes isolating the welfare beneﬁts of
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money extremely difﬁcult, if not futile.  The welfare
beneﬁts of money can be ascertained only by com-
paring monetary economies with economies that
have alternative arrangements for exchange, i.e.,
only by comparing the total welfare of a monetary
economy with that of a nonmonetary economy.49
The Welfare Costs of Inﬂation
The main implication of the discontinuity
between money and barter or credit as a medium
of exchange is that money will continue to be
used even at very high rates of inﬂation.  This
implies that the welfare costs of inﬂation, which
are associated with the reduced reliance on money
as a medium of exchange, may be relatively small.
This is particularly likely at relatively modest rates
of inﬂation.  Hence, it is not surprising that esti-
mates suggest that the cost of inﬂation is large only
at relatively high inﬂation rates (e.g., Bruno and
Easterly, 1996).
Furthermore, not only is it inappropriate to
estimate the welfare gains from the use of money
by adding up Harberger triangles, it is equally
inappropriate to measure the welfare costs of
inﬂation this way, as is frequently done.50 Since
money will continue to circulate as a medium
of exchange and since the ability to economize
further on money holdings is likely to be small,
so, too, is the cost of inﬂation from holding money
balances.  This is important because many discus-
sions about inﬂation assume that its principal
cost is the private shoe leather cost associated
with economizing on the use of money as a me-
dium of exchange.  If the externalities associated
with money are important and signiﬁcant, such
analyses understate the welfare costs of inﬂation,
perhaps signiﬁcantly.
Most economists would argue that if an econ-
omy were just starting, the optimal rate of inﬂation
would be zero.  Nevertheless, many argue that once
inﬂation is underway, society is better off tolerating
some inﬂation rather than to suffer the output loss
they believe would be associated with reducing
inﬂation to zero.  This idea is called Howitt’s (1990)
Rule.  The effects of inﬂation on the institutional
arrangements of trade are likely to be extremely
important, however, and these costs are missed
completely by estimates that ignore the externali-
ties associated with money’s roles as a medium of
exchange and a standard of value.  Consequently,
Tobin’s often cited dictum that “it takes a heap of
Harberger triangles to ﬁll an Okun gap,” which
underlies such analyses, is simply irrelevant if
there are signiﬁcant social costs of inﬂation.51
The third consequence of the discontinuity
between money and other methods of exchange is
that it may be inﬂation uncertainty, rather than
inﬂation per se, that produces the most signiﬁcant
welfare cost.  Here it is important to distinguish
between the medium of exchange and standard of
value functions of money.  An important beneﬁt of
money is that it reduces shopping costs—gathering
information about relative prices, planning, bud-
geting, etc.  Uncertainty interferes with the shop-
ping function by distorting price signals that enhance
market efﬁciency.  Price-level uncertainty makes
distinguishing between absolute and relative prices
and between permanent or transitory changes in
the price level difﬁcult.  Distortions to the pricing
mechanism affect the efﬁciency of markets that
affect investment (e.g., DeLong and Summers,
1991; and Barro, 1995), ﬁnancial markets, and rela-
tive input prices (e.g., Easterly, 1993).  Inﬂation also
reduces efﬁciency by encouraging the develop-
ment of alternative market structures that would
not exist in a world with a stable price level.  Be-
cause uncertainty about the future level of prices
increases with the average rate of inﬂation, these
costs are likely to be small at relatively low rates of
inﬂation but increase with the rate of inﬂation.
It could be, however, that the most deleterious
effects of inﬂation on economic welfare may come
from the effect of inﬂation on the efﬁcient function
of the credit market.  Both the rate of inﬂation and
49This may have implications for how money is modeled.  For example,
it is frequently the case that money is modeled in the context of one
good economy where exchange is implied but not explicitly modeled.
Given the possibility that there are large externalities associated with
money, this practice may not be useful for some issues.  It also may
have implications for other models.  For example, Lucas (1980, p. 145)
states, “When we apply theories of barter economies to problems in,
say, public ﬁnance or labor economics, it is not our intent to obtain
results applicable only to primitive or prehistoric societies.  We apply
this body of theory to money-using economies such as our own
because we believe that for many problems the fact that money is
used in attaining equilibrium can be abstracted from, or that the theo-
retical barter economy is a tractable, idealized model which approxi-
mates well (is well-approximated by) the actual monetary economy. 
If this practice is sound, then we want monetary theories which ratio-
nalize it or at least do not radically conﬂict with it.”
50For example, Bailey (1956), Friedman (1969) and Lucas (1994).
51For a critique of some other limitations of Howitt’s Rule, 
see Thornton (1996).  Also see Marty and Thornton (1995) for 
a discussion of some other arguments for the desirability of 
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inﬂation uncertainty are detrimental to denomi-
nating credit contracts in terms of ﬁxed units of
money.  Consequently, while high, accelerating,
and especially uncertain inﬂation may have a rela-
tively small effect on money’s medium-of-exchange
function, they may have a signiﬁcant effect on
ﬁnancial markets.  It is not easy to replace money
as the standard of value.  Recently, credit contracts
have been denominated in variable units of money, so
that the value of the contract varies with a measure
of the actual inﬂation experience during periods of
inﬂation uncertainty.  For reasons that are not well
understood, however, this practice has been relatively
limited, especially at relatively moderate inﬂation
rates.  Long-term debt markets tend to dry up during
periods of rapid inﬂation and, as a consequence,
the rate of capital formation slows.  While far from
deﬁnitive, the evidence suggests that the covariance
between inﬂation and the rate of economic growth
is negative (e.g., Bruno and Easterly, 1996).
While inﬂation potentially has a signiﬁcant
effect on the rate of economic growth, its potential
to affect the level of output may be modest.  To the
extent that high and accelerating inﬂation reduces
the reliance on money as either a medium of ex-
change or a standard of value, resources are drawn
from one use to another.  The result is that the level
of measured output may change relatively little
between high and low inﬂation states, but the dis-
tribution of output may be signiﬁcantly different
and the level of economic welfare may be signiﬁ-
cantly lower in higher inﬂation environments.
This may account for the fact that economists have
not found a statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between the rate of inﬂation and the level of output,
at least for relatively moderate rates of inﬂation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I have argued that money is a social arrange-
ment resulting from a complicated evolutionary
process.  Money exists because it facilitates exchange
by reducing the cost of trade.  Seen in this point of
view, money is but one of several institutional arrange-
ments designed to reduce the costs of exchange.
By reducing the cost of exchange, money reduces
the reservation relative price where trade is mutu-
ally advantageous thereby encouraging more trade
and greater specialization.  Because of their strategic
complementary, it is not surprising that money,
trade, and specialization have tended to evolve
simultaneously.
I argue that there are only three methods of
effecting trade: simple and sequential barter, simple
and sequential credit, and money.  I then explain
why the information and shopping costs of sequen-
tial barter and/or sequential credit are likely to be
high relative to those of money.  It is not surprising
that the world is populated with monetary econ-
omies and not barter or credit economies.
I also have argued that money has a signiﬁcant
cost advantage relative to simple barter and credit
and this advantage helps explain why the same
good has served most often as both the medium
of exchange and the unit of account, and why the
development and widespread use of money tends to
make simple barter scarce.
The use of money promotes specialization and
trade by reducing exchange costs.  The reduction
in exchange costs associated with money cannot
beneﬁt one individual without beneﬁting others.
Indeed, it is virtually impossible to internalize the
beneﬁts from money.  Consequently, there are sig-
niﬁcant externalities associated with the use of
money.  Money is a social arrangement whose ben-
eﬁts can be calculated correctly only by comparing
monetary economies with barter or credit economies.
I speculate that the social gains from the use of money
are likely to be large relative to the private opportu-
nity cost of holding it.  Furthermore, these beneﬁts
extend to nonresource-using ﬁat money.  Indeed, the
fact that nonresource-using money frees resources
for production and/or leisure necessarily implies that,
other things being the same, the transition from
commodity to ﬁat money is welfare enhancing.
I argue that money enjoys an enormous cost
advantage over barter or credit as a medium of
exchange.  Because of this, inﬂation is not likely to
result in a large-scale substitution away from money
as a medium exchange.  Hence, money continues
to circulate as a medium of exchange even during
periods of hyperinﬂation.  Signiﬁcant costs of inﬂa-
tion could be associated with the effects of inﬂation
uncertainty on the efﬁciency of the goods, labor,
and ﬁnancial markets, most especially the efﬁ-
ciency of the credit market because of the deterio-
ration of money’s function as a standard of value.
The fact that there are signiﬁcant externalities
associated with the use of money and that inﬂation
increases the costs of using money gives rise to the
possibility that the welfare costs of inﬂation are sig-
niﬁcant.  Because money dominates barter and credit
as a medium of exchange, the welfare costs of inﬂa-
tion due to a reduction in money’s role as a medium
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of exchange are likely to be small, relative to those
associated with its function as a standard of value.
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The Effect of
Exchange Costs of the
Exchange Ratio
Necessary for Trade 
Robert D. Dittmar 
and Daniel L. Thornton
The text argues that costly trade reduces the
feasible range of exchange ratios where trade is
mutually advantageous.  The question that arises is
by how much must the exchange ratio change to
compensate an individual for the costs of exchange
if there are ﬁxed exchange costs?  The question is
not answered easily because the relevant compar-
ison is the utility levels obtained with costly trade
and with autarky.  What must the terms of trade be
to compensate an individual for ﬁxed transactions
costs?  Some intuition about this can be obtained
by considering the effect of a small change in ﬁxed
costs in the borderline case when the individual is
indifferent between the autarkic consumption
bundle and the consumption bundle obtained by
paying a ﬁxed cost and trading.
Let (c1
A,c2
A) denote the individual’s consump-
tion bundle under autarky, and (c1
T,c2
T) denote the
individual’s consumption bundle with ﬁxed exchange
costs.  Indifference implies that 
(A.1)                       .
When production technologies are linear and the
terms of trade, l, are such that l ¹ f¢ 2/f¢ 1, individuals
specialize in the production of one of the goods,
good 1 or good 2.  The budget constraint 
(A.2)                      
is satisﬁed for individuals specializing in good 1,
and
(A.3)                
for individuals specializing in good 2.
The optimality of (c1
T,c2
T) with trade implies
that the individual equates the ratio of the
marginal utilities of the two goods to the exchange
ratio, l, so that
(A.4)                   
is satisﬁed.
Equation A.4, equation A.1, and one of the two
budget constraints above implicitly determine the
consumption bundle in the case of specialization
and the terms of trade that are necessary to com-
pensate the individual for trading when there is a
ﬁxed transaction cost, W.
In principle these equations can be solved to
determine the effect of W on l when an individual
specializes in the production of either of the two
goods.  A closed-form solution cannot be obtained,
however, without making explicit assumptions about
functional forms.  Linear approximations to these
functions that will be accurate predictors of the effects
of small transaction costs can be made, however.
These linear approximations are obtained by
implicitly differentiating the equations and evalu-
ating the resulting expressions at W=0.  Note that
if W=0, l = f¢ 2/f¢ 1 if an individual is to be indifferent
between trading and autarky.  Furthermore, at
these terms of trade, the individual must be indif-
ferent between specializing in the production of
good 1 or good 2.  Consequently, either of the
budget constraints above can be used as the starting
point of the approximation.  Finally, note that opti-
mization requires the individual to equate the ratio
of the marginal utilities of the two goods to terms
of trade.  In the absence of exchange costs, or
under autarky, the condition is
(A.5) .
To economize on notation, we use an overdot
to represent differentiation with respect to the
ﬁxed cost of exchange, W, i.e., l ˙=dl/dW.  Regard-
less of whether the individual specializes in good 1
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( A .6) .
Evaluating this expression at W=0 yields
(A.7) .
Implicitly differentiating Equation A.2, on 
the assumption the individual specializes in 
good 1, yields
(A.8) .
Evaluating this expression at W=0, yields
(A.9)
.
Combining Equations A.7 and A.9 and solving for
l ˙(0) yields
(A.10) .
Equation A.10 shows the effect on l of a small
ﬁxed transaction cost, evaluated at the point W=0.
Hence, an individual will be induced to specialize
in good 1 and trade only if the terms of trade are
approximately
(A.11)
or larger.  This result is intuitive.  The quantity
f1(G ) 2 c1
A is approximately the amount of good 1
that the individual must give up to trade.  Hence,
W/(f1(G ) 2 c1
A) is the extra amount of good 2, per
unit of good 1 exchanged, that the individual must
obtain to be compensated for the ﬁxed cost of
entering the market.
A similar analysis applies to individuals that
specialize in the production of good 2.  In this case,
Equation A.3 is differentiated to obtain
(A.12)                   .
Evaluating Equation A.12 at W=0, as before, yields,
(A.13) .
Combining Equations A.7 and A.13, yields
(A.14) .
Hence, an individual will be induced to specialize
in good 2 and trade only if the terms of trade are
(A.15)
or smaller.  The quantity 2W/c1
A is the discount per
unit of good 1 purchased required to compensate
the individual for the ﬁxed cost of trade.
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